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Heterogeneous Returns to Human Capital
and Dynamic Self-Selection*
Christian Belzil†, Jörgen Hansen‡
Résumé / Abstract
Dans cet article, nous estimons un modèle de programmation dynamique
des choix en éducation dans lequel les rendements moyens et marginaux (en
éducation et en expérience) sont propres à chaque individu. Nos résultats
indiquent une forte corrélation positive entre rendements en éducation et
rendements en expérience. Après avoir intégré les effets individuels aléatoires, la
fonction de salaire est de forme convexe (les rendements en éducation croissent
avec l'éducation). Les effets antagonistes des rendements en éducation et en
expérience impliquent une très faible corrélation entre les rendements individuels
et l'éducation observée.
We estimate a structural dynamic programming model of schooling
decisions and obtain individual specific estimates of the local (and average)
returns to schooling as well as the returns to experience. Homogeneity of the
returns to human capital is strongly rejected in favor of a discrete distribution
version of the random coefficient specification. The results indicate that
individuals who have the higher returns to schooling are also those who have the
higher returns to experience. There is a 5.9 percentage points difference in the
average return to schooling at college graduation between high and low market
ability individuals (2.3% vs 8.2%) and a 5.4 percentage points difference in the
return to experience upon entrance in the labor market (3.1% vs 8.5%). When
averaged over all types, the return to experience in the early phase of the life
cycle (6.8%) exceeds the average return to schooling (6.4% at college
graduation). After conditioning on a specific type, the log wage regression
function remains rather convex in schooling. The conflictual effects of the returns
to schooling and experience on schooling decisions imply weak dynamic self-
selection; that is educational attainments are only weakly correlated with
individual differences in the returns to schooling.
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1 Introduction
The eect of schooling on wages is one of the most widely studied topic
in empirical economics. Whether set in a reduced-form framework or in
a structural framework, empirical models are usually based on the ad-hoc
assumptions that individual dierences in market ability can be captured in
the intercept term of the wage regression function and that log wages vary
linearly with schooling. The validity of both of these assumptions is however
starting to be questioned seriously by empirical labor economists.
First, when individual dierences in market ability are reected in the
intercept term of the wage regression equation, those endowed with high
market ability have a higher opportunity costs of schooling. In a more general
framework, in which market ability can also aects the slope of the wage
function, this argument is not necessarily true. As a consequence, it is natural
to estimate the returns to schooling in a random coeÆcient framework, in
which potential comparative advantages in schooling can be captured (see
Heckman and Vytlacil,1998 and 2000).
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The validity of the linearity assumption is also questionable. In a log
linear regression model, the local returns to schooling are assumed to be
constant and estimates of the return obtained in this framework might be
strongly aected by the local returns corresponding to graduation. Belzil
and Hansen (2000) use a structural dynamic programming model to obtain
exible estimates of the return to schooling from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) and nd that a model with constant local returns is
strongly rejected in favor of a convex log wage regression function composed
of 8 segments.
2
While both the possibility of non-linearities and population heterogene-
ity are starting to be recognized, as far as we know the returns to schooling
have never been investigated in a framework which allows simultaneously for
non-constant local returns as well as population heterogeneity in the returns.
1
Indeed, the need for a random coeÆcient representation of the log wage equation has
been recognized as early as in Becker and Chiswick (1966).
2
The average return over the entire range (around 4% per year) is found to be much
lower than what is usually reported in the reduced-form literature. The model also im-
ply a positive correlation between market ability and realized schooling attainments (the
\Ability Bias"). Taber (1999) also investigates the empirical importance of the Ability
Bias.
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This might be a serious drawback. If the individuals who have higher mar-
ket ability also have a comparative advantage in schooling (experience higher
returns to schooling) and acquire more schooling, the convexity of the wage
regression function might only reect dynamic self-selection (merely a com-
position eect). That is, as we move toward higher levels of schooling, the
local returns to schooling may turn out to be estimated from an increasingly
large proportion of high ability workers. However, allowing for individual spe-
cic returns to schooling is not suÆcient to capture all dimensions of market
ability. If more able individuals face higher returns to schooling, they may
also face a higher return to experience. For instance, those individuals expe-
riencing high returns to schooling may also have comparative advantages in
on-the-job training. If so, a reliable estimation method must allow for ability
heterogeneity to aect both the local returns to schooling and experience,
while allowing the local returns to change with grade level.
The main objective of this paper is to obtain structural estimates of the
local and average returns to schooling within a framework where the log wage
regression function is estimated exibly (the returns may vary with grade lev-
el) and is aected by population heterogeneity.
3
A second objective is to
investigate the nature of dynamic self-selection; that is the relationship be-
tween individual specic returns to human capital and schooling attainments.
Finally, a third objective is to compare the returns obtained in a random co-
eÆcient framework to those obtained in more standard framework in which
the slope coeÆcients are homogeneous in the population. The model is im-
plemented on a panel of white males taken from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY). The panel covers a period going from 1979 until
1990.
The main results are as follows. Homogeneity of the returns to human
capital (schooling and experience) is strongly rejected in favor of a discrete
distribution version of the random coeÆcient model specication. Those
individuals who have the higher returns to schooling (comparative advantages
in schooling) are also those who have the higher returns to experience. There
is a 5.9 percentage points dierence in the average return to schooling at
college graduation between high and low market ability individuals (2.3%
vs 8.2%) and a 5.4 percentage points dierence in the return to experience
3
The structure of the dynamic programming model is identical to Belzil and Hansen
(2000).
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(3.1% vs 8.5%). When averaged over all types, the return to experience in the
early phase of the life cycle (6.8%) exceeds the average return to schooling
(6.4% at college graduation). After conditioning on a specic type, the log
wage regression function remains rather convex in schooling. The conictual
eects of the returns to schooling and experience on schooling decisions imply
weak dynamic self-selection; that is dierences in educational attainments are
only weakly positively correlated with individual dierences in the returns
to schooling. We also nd that a model with individual specic returns to
schooling and a homogeneous return to experience performs poorly. It fails
to capture a signicant dierence in the average return to schooling between
high and low market ability individuals. This is easily understood. Those
individuals endowed with a high return to schooling are also faced with a
high return to experience. If dierences in the returns to schooling were the
only source of comparative advantages (individuals share the same return
to experience), the more able would obtain a substantially higher level of
schooling than those who are less able. However, such a positive correlation
between market ability and schooling attainments is not born by the data
and, as a consequence, the likelihood estimates indicate a minimal level of
heterogeneity in the returns to schooling.
The paper is structured as follows. The empirical dynamic programming
model is exposed in Section 2. A brief description of the sample data is found
in Section 3. The structural parameter estimates are discussed in Section 4
and the goodness of t is evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted to
the empirical analysis of the role of unobserved labor market ability in ex-
plaining dynamic self-selection. In Section 7, we present a statistical test for
the random coeÆcient specication and discuss briey an alternative model
specication which ignores heterogeneity in the return to experience. Section
8 is devoted to a comparison of our estimates with those obtained by OLS
as well as structural parameter estimates ignoring population heterogeneity.
The conclusion is in Section 9.
3
2 An Empirical Dynamic ProgrammingMod-
el
In this section, we introduce the empirical dynamic programming model.
Every individual i is initially endowed with family human capital (X
i
), innate
market and school ability and a rate of time preference (). Young individuals
decide sequentially whether it is optimal or not to enter the labor market
or continue accumulate human capital. Individuals maximize discounted
expected lifetime utility over a nite horizon T and have identical preferences.
Both the instantaneous utility of being in school and the utility of work
are logarithmic. The control variable, d
it
; summarizes the stopping rule.
When d
it
= 1; an individual invests in an additional year of schooling at the
beginning of period t. When d
it
= 0, an individual leaves school at the
beginning of period t (to enter the labor market). Every decision is made
at the beginning the period and the amount of schooling acquired by the
beginning of date t is denoted S
it
:
2.1 Household Characteristics and the Utility of At-
tending School
When in school, individuals receive income support, denoted 
it
: These trans-
fers are understood to be net of direct costs (such as books, transportation or
other costs). When an individual leaves school, he looses parental support.
The instantaneous utility of attending school, ln(
it
); is represented by the
following equation
ln(
it
) = X
0
i
Æ +  (S
it
) + 

i
+ "

it
(1)
with "

it
 i:i:d N(0; 
2

) and represents a stochastic utility shock. The vector
X
i
contains the following variables: father's education, mother's education,
household income, number of siblings, family composition at age 14 and
regional controls. The number of siblings is used to control for the fact
that, other things equal, the amount of parental resources spent per child
decreases with the number of siblings. The household composition variable
(Nuclear Family) is equal to 1 for those who lived with both their biological
parents (at age 14) and is likely to be correlated with the psychic costs
of attending school. The geographical variables are introduced in order to
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control for the possibility that direct (as well as psychic) costs of schooling
may dier between those raised in urban areas and those raised in rural
areas, and between those raised in the south and those raised in the north.
Yearly family income is measured in units of $1,000. The term 

i
represents
individual heterogeneity (ability) aecting the utility of attending school. It
is discussed in more details below. The marginal eect of schooling level on
parental transfers,  (:); is modeled using spline functions.
2.2 Interruption of schooling
We assume that individuals interrupt schooling with exogenous probability
 and, as a consequence, the possibility to take a decision depends on a state
variable I
it
: When I
it
= 1; the decision problem is frozen for one period.
If I
it
= 0; the decision can be made. The interruption state is meant to
capture events such as illness, injury, travel, temporary work, incarceration
or academic failure. When an interruption occurs, the stock of human capital
remains constant over the period. The NLSY does not contain data on
parental transfers and, in particular, does not allow a distinction in income
received according to the interruption status. As a consequence, we ignore
the distinction between income support while in school and income support
when school is interrupted.
4
2.3 The Return to Human Capital
The log wage received by individual i, at time t, is given by
logw
it
= '
m
1i
(S
it
) + '
m
2i
:Exper
it
+ '
m
3
:Exper
2
it
+ 
w
i
+ "
w
it
(2)
where '
m
1i
(S
t
) is the individual specic function representing the wage return
to schooling. Both '
m
2i
and '
m
3
are parameters to be estimated and 
w
i
is
unobserved labor market ability. As we do not observe wage data over the
entire lifetime, it is diÆcult to identify individual specic quadratic terms. As
a consequence, only the linear term in experience is allowed to be individual
4
When faced with a high failure probability, some individuals may spend a portion of
the year in school and a residual portion out of school. As a result, identifying a real
interruption from a true academic failure is tenuous. In the NLSY, we nd that more
than 85% of the sample has never experienced school interruption.
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specic. The non-wage benet is assumed to be log-linear in schooling, that
is
logw

it
= '
nm
0
+ '
nm
1
 S
it
where '
nm
0
and '
nm
1
are parameters to be estimated. The employment rate,
e
it
; is also allowed to depend on accumulated human capital (S
it
and Exper
it
)
so that
ln e

it
= ln
1
e
it
= 
0i
+ 
1
 S
it
+ 
2
 Exper
it
+ 
3
 Exper
2
it
+ "
e
it
(3)
where 
0i
is an individual specic intercept term, 
1
represents the employ-
ment security return to schooling, both 
2
and 
3
represent the employment
security return to experience.
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The random shock "
e
it
is normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance 
2
e
: All random shocks ("

it
; "
w
it
; "
e
it
) are assumed to
be independent.
2.4 Bellman Equations
It is convenient to summarize the state variables in a vector (S
it
; 
it
) where 
it
is itself a vector containing the interruption status (I
it
); the utility shock ("

it
),
the wage shock ("
w
it
); the employment shock ("
e
it
); and accumulated experience
(Exper
it
). We only model the decision to acquire schooling beyond 6 years
(as virtually every individual in the sample has completed at least six years
of schooling). We set T to 65 years and the maximum number of years of
schooling to 22. Dropping the individual subscript, the decision to remain in
school, given state variables S
t
and 
t
, denoted V
s
t
(S
t
; 
t
); can be expressed
as
V
s
t
(S
t
; 
t
) = ln(
t
) + f  EV
I
t+1
(S
t+1
; 
t+1
) (4)
+(1  ) EMax[V
s
t+1
(S
t+1
; 
t+1
); V
w
t+1
(S
t+1
; 
t+1
)]g
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It follows that the expected value and the variance of the log employment rate are
given by E log e
t
=   exp(
t
+
1
2

2
e
) and V ar(log e
t
) = exp(2
t
+ 
2
e
)  (exp(
2
e
)   1)
respectively.
6
where V
I
t+1
(S
t+1
; 
t+1
) denotes the value of interrupting schooling acquisition.
As we cannot distinguish between income support while in school and income
support when school is interrupted, the value of interrupting schooling ac-
quisition is identical to the value of attending school. The value of stopping
school (that is entering the labor market), V
w
t
(S
t
; 
t
), is given by
V
w
t
(S
t
) = ln(w
it
 w

it
 e
it
) + E(V
t+1
j d
t
= 0) (5)
where E(V
t+1
j d
t
= 0) is simply the expected utility of working from t + 1
until T . Using the terminal value and the distributional assumptions about
the stochastic shocks, the probability of choosing a particular sequence of
discrete choice can readily be expressed in closed-form.
2.5 Unobserved Ability in School and in the Labor
Market
The intercept terms of the utility of attending school (

i
); the employment
rate equation (
0i
) and of the log wage regression function (
w
i
) are individual
specic. As well, we allow the local returns to schooling '
m
1i
(S
it
) and the eect
of experience '
m
2i
to vary across individuals. We assume that there are K
types of individuals. Each type is endowed with a vector of intercept terms
(
w
k
; 

k
; 
0k
) for k = 1; 2:::K . The results reported in this paper are for the
case where K = 6. However, it is unrealistic to try to identify 6 dierent
functions representing the local returns to schooling as well as 6 dierent
returns to experience. As a consequence, we assume that the individual
specic returns to schooling and experience can be summarized in 2 dierent
functions; one for Group A (types 1, 2 and 3) and one for Group B (types 4,
5 and 6). That is
 '
m
1k
(:) = '
m
1A
(:) for k = 1; 2 and 3
 '
m
1k
(:) = '
m
1B
(:) for k = 4; 5 and 6:
 '
m
2k
(:) = '
m
2A
(:) for k = 1; 2 and 3
 '
m
2k
(:) = '
m
2B
(:) for k = 4; 5 and 6:
The distribution of unobserved ability is orthogonal to parents' back-
ground by construction and, as a consequence, should be understood as a
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measure of unobserved ability remaining after conditioning on parents hu-
man capital. The probability of belonging to type k; p
k
; are estimated using
logistic transforms
p
k
=
exp(q
0
k
)
P
6
j=1
exp(q
0
j
)
and with the restriction that q
6
= 0.
2.6 Identication
As discussed in Belzil and Hansen (2000), identication of most parameters
is relatively straightforward. Nevertheless, estimation of our model will re-
quire normalization. Given the absence of data on non-wage benets, it is
impossible to separate the intercept term of the non-wage benet equation
(common to every individual) from the intercept term of the utility of at-
tending school. As a consequence, the intercept term of the non-wage benet
must be absorbed in the utility of attending school and '
nm
0
is set to 0. Al-
so, as is well known, identication of the subjective discount rate relies on
the standard assumption that preferences are time additive. Finally, it also
important to note that, given the relatively modest number of individuals at
both very low and very high levels of schooling, it is diÆcult to identify more
than two dierent regression functions. This is a consequence of our exible
specication of the log wage regression function.
2.7 The Likelihood Function
Constructing the likelihood function (for a given type k) is relatively straight-
forward. It has three components; the probability of having spent at most
 years in school (L
1k
), the probability of entering the labor market in year
+1; at observed wage w
+1
(denoted L
2k
) and the density of observed wages
and employment rates from  + 2 until 1990 (denoted L
3k
): L
1k
can easily
be evaluated using (4) and (5), while L
2k
can be factored as the product of
a normal conditional probability times the marginal wage density. Finally
L
3k
is just the product of wages densities (2) and employments densities (3).
For a given type k, the likelihood is therefore L
k
= L
1k
L
2k
L
3k
and the log
likelihood function to be maximized is
8
logL = log
6
X
k=1
p
k
 L
k
(6)
where each p
k
represents the population proportion of type k.
3 The Data
The sample used in the analysis is extracted from the 1979 youth cohort of
the The National Longitudinal Survey of Y outh (NLSY). The NLSY is a
nationally representative sample of 12,686 Americans who were 14-21 years
old as of January 1, 1979. After the initial survey, re-interviews have been
conducted in each subsequent year until 1996. In this paper, we restrict our
sample to white males who were age 20 or less as of January 1, 1979. We
record information on education, wages and on employment rates for each
individual from the time the individual is age 16 up to December 31, 1990.
The original sample contained 3,790 white males. However, we lacked in-
formation on family background variables (such as family income as of 1978
and parents' education). We lost about 17% of the sample due to missing
information regarding family income and about 6% due to missing informa-
tion regarding parents' education. The age limit and missing information
regarding actual work experience further reduced the sample to 1,710.
Descriptive statistics for the sample used in the estimation can be found
in Table 1. The education length variable is the reported highest grade com-
pleted as of May 1 of the survey year and individuals are also asked if they
are currently enrolled in school or not.
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This question allows us to identify
those individuals who are still acquiring schooling and therefore to take into
account that education length is right-censored for some individuals. It also
helps us to identify those individuals who have interrupted schooling. Over-
all, the majority of young individuals acquire education without interruption.
The low incidence of interruptions (Table 1) explains the low average number
of interruptions per individual (0.22) and the very low average interruption
duration (0.43 year) . In our sample, only 306 individuals have experienced
at least one interruption. This represents only 18% of our sample and it is
6
This feature of the NLSY implies that there is a relatively low level of measurement
error in the education variable.
9
along the lines of results reported in Keane and Wolpin (1997).
7
Given the
age of the individuals in our sample, we assume that those who have already
started to work full-time by 1990 (94% of our sample), will never return to
school beyond 1990. Finally, one notes that the number of interruptions is
relatively small.
Unlike many reduced-form studies which use proxies for post-schooling
labor market experience (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin), we use actual labor
market experience. Actual experience accumulated is computed using the
fraction of the year worked by a given individual. The availability of data
on actual employment rates allows use to estimate the employment security
return to schooling.
The average schooling completed (by 1990) is 12.8 years. As described
in Belzil and Hansen (2000), it is clear that the distribution of schooling
attainments is bimodal. There is a large fraction of young individuals who
terminate school after 12 years (high school graduation). The next largest
frequency is at 16 years and corresponds to college graduation. Altogether,
more than half of the sample has obtained either 12 or 16 years of schooling.
As a consequence, one might expect that either the wage return to schooling
or the parental transfers vary substantially with grade level. This question
will be addressed below.
4 Structural Estimates of the Return to Hu-
man Capital
The parameter estimates surrounding the utility of attending school, the sub-
jective discount rate and the interruption probability are found in Table 2A.
The estimates are very close to those reported in Belzil and Hansen (2000)
and we do not discuss them in details.
8
The parameter estimates character-
7
Overall, interruptions tend to be quite short. Almost half of the individuals (45 %)
who experienced an interruption, returned to school within one year while 73% returned
within 3 years.
8
The estimates indicate that, other things equal, the utility of attending school increases
with parents' education and income. These results are standard in the literature. While
the results indicate that mean schooling attainments are increasing with family human
capital, they illustrate the relatively weak correlation between parents' human capital and
individuals schooling attainments. This is explained by the fact that unobserved school
10
izing the distribution of all individual specic intercept terms (school ability,
employment and wage regression) are found in Table 2B. The estimates of
the logistic transforms used to infer the type proportions are also in Table
2B.
The structural estimates of the return to human capital are found in
Table 3A. To set the number of splines, we experienced with a larger number
of segments (up to 9) and remove the splines that were less signicant.
9
As
a result, we end up with 6 segments. The local returns are constant from
grade 7 to grade 12 and change with grade level between grade 13 and 17.
The spline estimates of the local returns to schooling are found in Table 3A.
These estimates have been transformed into local returns (after adding up
the proper parameters). For each grade level, a corresponding average return
has also been computed. The local and average returns are reported in Table
3B. They are analyzed in details below.
An examination of the intercept terms of the wage equation, the employ-
ment equation and the utility of attending school (Table 2B) reveals that
heterogeneity in employment rates and school ability is relatively more im-
portant than heterogeneity in the wage intercept. This is a consequence of
allowing both the returns to schooling and experience to be individual spe-
cic. Indeed, the dispersion in the wage returns to schooling and experience
(Table 3A and Table 3B) should be taken as strong evidence in favor of a
random coeÆcient specication.
The results indicate clearly that those individuals endowed with higher
returns to schooling (group B) are also endowed with a higher return to expe-
rience. Within groups, the local returns are generally increasing with grade
level. For those belonging to group A, the local returns are 0.0048 (grade 7
to 12), 0.0253 (grade 13), 0.0709 (grade 14), 0.0486 (grade 15), 0.0596 (grade
16) and 0.0553 (grade 17-more). The average return to schooling increases
smoothly from 0.48% in grade 7 up to 2.33% at college graduation (grade 16).
For those belonging to group B, the local returns are 0.0614 between grade
7 to 12, 0.0908 in grade 13, 0.1278 in grade 14, 0.1142 in grade 15, 0.1206
ability plays an important part in explaining individual schooling attainments. Similar
results are reported in Belzil and Hansen (2000), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) and Keane
and Wolpin (1997).
9
As in Belzil and Hansen (2000), we found that the local returns to schooling vary
much more beyond high school graduation (from grade 13 onward) than before high school
graduation (between grade 7 and 12).
11
in grade 16 and 0.1210 beyond grade 16. These local estimates also imply a
smooth increase in the average return. The average returns range from 6.14%
in grade 7 to 8.57% at college graduation. While there is a large dierence
between the returns to schooling of low ability and high ability workers, each
type specic log wage regression function discloses the same tendency for the
local returns to increase with grade level. As a consequence, the convexity of
the log wage regression function reported in Belzil and Hansen (2000) does
not seem to be explained by a composition eect. It appears robust to the
allowance for population heterogeneity in the returns to human capital.
Interestingly, the dierence in average returns to schooling (around 0.059)
is quite close to the dierence in the returns to experience. For those individ-
uals endowed with low return to schooling (group A), the return to experience
upon entrance in the labor market is 0.0308. The return to experience for
individuals belonging to group B is substantially higher; it is found to be
0.0850. Since we are restricting the quadratic terms to be equal (in order to
facilitate comparison), individual dierences in the return to experience are
captured solely in the experience parameter. These estimates imply that
the return to every additional year of experience, in the early phase of the
life cycle, exceeds the average return to schooling.
10
5 Accuracy of Predicted Schooling
As indicated earlier, the empirical distribution of schooling attainments dis-
closes an important clustering around grade levels corresponding to high
school graduation (grade 12) and college graduation (grade 16). The actual
schooling attainment frequencies are reported in the second column of Table
5 while schooling attainments predicted by the structural model are found in
column 1. There is clear evidence that the exible specication of our model
allows us to predict schooling attainments accurately. While our predictions
are slightly less accurate at very low levels of schooling (grade 6 to grade
8) and high grade levels (grade 18 or more), they are particularly accurate
at those grade levels corresponding to high school and college graduation.
Overall, our model ts data on schooling attainments very well. While the
10
This results was also obtained with homogeneous returns to schooling (see Belzil and
Hansen, 2000).
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model is arguably stylized, it seems to capture the essential features in the
data.
6 Labor Market Ability and Dynamic Self-
Selection
In standard log wage regression models, where ability heterogeneity is cap-
tured in the intercept term and where every individuals face the same return
to schooling, higher labor market ability implies a higher opportunity cost of
being in school. In a random coeÆcient framework, the argument no longer
follows. Those individuals who are able to transform schooling inputs into
a higher level of human capital, will benet from higher returns to educa-
tion and are most likely those who will attain high schooling attainments. If
so, a sub-population of highly educated workers may tend to be composed
of a majority of high market ability workers who may have higher returns
to schooling. At the same time, individuals who have a higher return to
experience will be impatient to enter the labor market and experience up-
ward sloping wage proles. If those who face high returns to schooling are
also those who face high returns to experience, dierences in the returns to
schooling and experience may counterbalance each other. The links between
market ability and schooling is therefore ambiguous.
The type probabilities can be used to compute the correlation between
various individual specic intercept terms as well as the correlation between
school ability and the return to human capital. These are found in Table 4A.
Overall, the correlations are all of the expected sign. The correlation between
school ability and the wage intercept (corr(

; 
w
)), the correlation between
school ability and the employment rate intercept (corr(

; 
0
)) and the
correlation between the wage intercept and the employment rate intercept
(corr(
w
; 
0
)) are all found to be positive. They are equal to 0.43, 0.59 and
0.45 respectively. Not surprisingly, there is also a positive correlation (0.27)
between school ability and the returns to schooling corr(

k
; '
m
1k
). Obviously,
this also implies a positive correlation between school ability and the return
to experience.
In order to illustrate dynamic self-selection, we have computed expected
schooling attainments and expected wages for each type, along with their
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respective rank. The results are summarized in Table 4B. Within each group,
dierences in schooling attainments are explained by dierences in school
ability (

) and dierences in the intercept term of the wage function (
w
)
as well as the employment equation (
0
). Across groups, dierences in type
specic expected wages and schooling are also explained by dierences in
the return to schooling and experience and, in particular, by the correlation
between school ability and the return to human capital.
Overall, the type specic predicted schooling attainments vary much less
than do expected wages. The average predicted schooling attainments for the
3 types endowed with a low return to human capital (Group A) is 12.40 years
and is just below the average for group B (12.90 years). This illustrates the
fact that those who have higher return to human capital obtain slightly more
schooling. It is partly explained by the positive correlation between school
ability (

1
) and the return to human capital. While individuals belonging
to group B ( type 4, type 5 and type 6) obtain slightly more education than
other types, they obtain much higher wages. This may be explained by the
fact that those individuals endowed with high school ability are also endowed
with high return to schooling as well as high return to experience. As a
consequence, the high return to experience counter balances the willingness
to invest in school activities.
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7 The Local and Average Returns to School-
ing: Testing for Population Heterogeneity
At this stage, it is natural to investigate whether dierences in the returns to
human capital across groups are statistically signicant. A formal approach
requires to construct a restricted version of the model. The restricted model
has 6 types of individuals and, as for the unrestricted model, each type is
endowed with a type specic employment, wage and school ability intercept
term. However, each type must share the same return to schooling and expe-
11
In order to separate the eects of schooling and experience, we have simulated d-
ierences in schooling attainments across types when either the return to schooling or
the return to experience are set to the population average. Not surprisingly, we nd a
huge positive correlation between individual specic return to schooling and schooling at-
tainments as well as a huge negative correlation between the returns to experience and
schooling attainments.
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rience. This amounts to imposing 7 restrictions ( 6 splines for the return to
schooling and the eect of experience). Testing homogeneity can be achieved
using a likelihood ratio statistic. The estimation of the restricted model lead
to a value of -13.7505 for the average log likelihood which in turn, translated
into a p-value below 0.01. We conclude that homogeneity is strongly rejected
and that a random coeÆcient specication of the wage regression function is
an accurate representation of the importance of population heterogeneity.
In view of the recent literature on estimating average and local treatment
eects, in which the estimates of the return to schooling are often interpreted
in a random coeÆcient framework (Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999 and Imbens
and Angrist, 1994), we also estimated a version of the model where individual
dierences in the return to human capital are captured only in the returns to
schooling. Overall, this model specication did not perform really well. First,
the average log likelihood was found to be -13.7393 (as opposed to 13.6313
for the unrestricted model) and the likelihood ratio tests strongly rejects
the homogeneity of the return to experience at the 0.01 level. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, the model is incapable of capturing meaningful
dierences in the average return to schooling. The average return to schooling
at college graduation is 0.0620 for Group A and 0.0676 for Group B. The
failure of the model can be explained as follows. If dierences in the returns to
schooling were the only source of comparative advantages (individuals share
the same return to experience), the more able would obtain a substantially
higher level of schooling than those who are less able. However, such a
positive correlation between market ability and schooling attainments is not
born by the data and, as a consequence, the likelihood estimates indicate a
minimal level of heterogeneity in the returns to schooling.
8 Comparisons Between Various Estimates of
the Average Returns to Schooling and Ex-
perience
In the reduced- form literature, the return to schooling is typically estimat-
ed within a linear regression framework using OLS estimate or IV methods.
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Estimating log wage regression functions by OLS will typically require both
schooling and experience to be orthogonal to labor market ability. When us-
ing IV techniques, it is customary to ignore actual labor market experience
and use approximate measures such as age or potential experience. If actual
experience is the appropriate proxy for post-schooling human capital invest-
ments, using a dierent measure may introduce a serious mis-specication
in the log wage regression model (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin, for a critical
review of the literature).
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It is therefore informative to compare our estimates with standard OLS
estimates obtained from cross-sectional regressions and with the structural
estimates obtained under the maintained hypothesis that both the returns
to schooling and experience are homogenous. In order to compare the struc-
tural estimates with those obtained by OLS, we report the average return
to schooling at grade 12 and at grade 16. The structural estimates obtained
within a random coeÆcient framework are in the rst column of Table 6
while those estimates obtained from a restricted version of the model (with
homogeneous returns) are in column 2. OLS estimates based on the 1990
cross-section are in column 3 and column 4 (OLS with splines).
The structural estimates of the average return to schooling at high school
graduation and at college graduation (4.4% and 6.4%) are both much lower
than OLS estimates.
13
Within a standard OLS specication, the average (and
local) return is around10.0%. When non-linearities are taken into account
using splines, the OLS estimates of the average return are 8.8% at high
school graduation and 10.5% at college graduation. This is consistent with
the fact that OLS estimates may suer a strong ability bias. However, it
should also be noted the estimates obtained from the restricted version of
the structural dynamic programming model (in column 2) are lower than
the structural (random coeÆcient) estimates. In the restricted structural
model, the average return is 1.2% at high school graduation and 4.3% at
college graduation. While there is evidence that OLS regression lead to an
over-statement of the true return to schooling, the converse is true about the
return to experience. The structural estimates of the return to experience
(6.8% with population heterogeneity and 8.2% in the standard model) are
12
In our sample, the correlation between schooling attainments and actual experience
(as of 1990) is equal to -0.5095.
13
A similar result was obtained in Belzil and Hansen (2000a).
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much higher than those obtained by OLS (between 5.1 and 5.2%).
At this stage, it is possible to draw some conclusions. First, point esti-
mates of the returns to schooling and experience are sensitive to the allowance
for population heterogeneity in the returns to human capital. This is not sur-
prising. A random coeÆcient specication oers a completely dierent way
of interpreting dynamic self-selection and, in particular, the correlation be-
tween labor market ability and schooling attainments. Despite the dierences
in point estimates between a random coeÆcient specication and the more
standard approach, there is overwhelming evidence that estimates of the re-
turn to schooling obtained from a structural dynamic programming model
are lower than OLS estimates as well as other estimates reported in the lit-
erature (see Card, 2000). We also note that setting the empirical analysis of
the log wage regression function in a random coeÆcient framework has not
changed the overall shape of the log wage regression function. As in Belzil
and Hansen (2000), we nd much lower returns to high school education than
for post- secondary education. After conditioning on a specic type, the log
wage regression function remains rather convex in schooling.
14
Finally, it is clear that allowing for individual dierences in the slopes
of age-earnings prole will allow us to t data on wages much better than
models based on homogeneous returns to schooling and experience. In order
to evaluate the capacity of the random coeÆcient model to t data on wages,
we have computed the ratio of the variance of explained wages and actual
wages for all three model specications considered. Overall, the random
coeÆcient framework can explain up to 66% of variances in observed wages.
this is much higher than what is observed for OLS estimates (24%) and for a
structural dynamic programming model where the returns is estimated using
8 splines (Belzil and Hansen, 2000a).
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated a structural dynamic programming model
of schooling decisions and obtain individual specic estimates of the local
14
The log wage regression function with homogeneous returns however requires as many
as 8 splines (Belzil and Hansen, 2000). This is explained by the fact that equality between
successive spline segments at grade 11 and grade 12 fails to be rejected when the returns
are individual specic.
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(and average) returns to schooling as well as the returns to experience. Ho-
mogeneity of the returns to human capital is strongly rejected in favor of
a discrete distribution version of the random coeÆcient specication. The
results indicate that individuals who have the higher returns to schooling are
also those who have higher returns to experience.
The structural estimates of the average return to schooling at high school
graduation and at college graduation (4.4% and 6.4%) are both much lower
than estimates reported in the literature. Indeed, when averaged over all
types, the return to experience in the early phase of the life cycle (6.8%)
exceeds the average return to schooling (6.4% at college graduation). Af-
ter conditioning on ability, the log wage regression function appears rather
convex. As those individuals who have comparative advantages in schooling
are also those who are faced with higher returns to experience, the model
implies weak dynamic self-selection (weak correlation between market ability
heterogeneity and schooling attainments) and strong wage dispersion.
As far as we know, the returns to schooling have never been estimated in
such a general framework. There are therefore no benchmark result in the
literature. Nevertheless, our estimates cast doubts on the validity of the very
high returns usually reported in the literature.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
Mean St dev. # of individuals
Family Income/1000 36,904 27.61 1710
father's educ 11.69 3.47 1710
mother's educ 11.67 2.46 1710
# of siblings 3.18 2.13 1710
prop. raised in urban areas 0.73 - 1710
prop. raised in south 0.27 - 1710
prop in nuclear family 0.79 - 1710
AFQT/10 49.50 28.47 1710
Schooling completed (1990) 12.81 2.58 1710
# of interruptions 0.06 0.51 1710
duration of interruptions (year) 0.43 1.39 1710
wage 1979 (hour) 7.36 2.43 217
wage 1980 (hour) 7.17 2.74 422
wage 1981 (hour) 7.18 2.75 598
wage 1982 (hour) 7.43 3.17 819
wage 1983 (hour) 7.35 3.21 947
wage 1984 (hour) 7.66 3.60 1071
wage 1985 (hour) 8.08 3.54 1060
wage 1986 (hour) 8.75 3.87 1097
wage 1987 (hour) 9.64 4.44 1147
wage 1988 (hour) 10.32 4.89 1215
wage 1989 (hour) 10.47 4.97 1232
wage 1990 (hour) 10.99 5.23 1230
Experience 1990 (years) 8.05 11.55 1230
Note: Family income and hourly wages are reported in 1990 dollars.
Family income is measured as of May 1978. The increasing number of wage
observations is explained by the increase in participation rates.
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Table 2A
The Utility of Attending School, Subjective Discount Rates and
Interruption Probabilities
Parameter Std error
Utility in School
Father's Educ 0.0082 0.0010
Mother's Educ 0.0053 0.0011
Family Income/1000 0.0005 0.0001
Nuclear Family 0.0155 0.0050
Siblings -0.0061 0.0010
Rural -0.0001 0.0042
South -0.0149 0.0044
Stand.Dev.(

) 0.1940 0.0105
Educ. Splines
Æ
7 10
0.0918 0.0103
Æ
11
0.4559 0.0234
Æ
12
-1.3735 0.0248
Æ
13
0.7497 0.0249
Æ
14
1.6879 0.0072
Æ
15
-1.1015 0.0190
Æ
16
1.1700 0.0476
Æ
17 more
-0.5857 0.0545
Interruption Prob. 0.0749 0.0036
Discount Rate 0.0111 0.0001
mean log Likelihood -13.6313
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Table 2B
Individual Specic Intercept Terms and Type Probabilities
Parameter St Error Rank
Type 1 

1
School ab. -2.5433 0.0091 4

w
1
Wage 1.4836 0.0094 4

01
Employment -3.3629 0.0301 4
q
0
1
Type Prob. -0.6301 0.0419 -
Type 2 

2
School ab. -2.2750 0.0200 2

w
2
Wage ab. 2.0051 0.0192 1

02
Employment -2.3251 0.0189 5
q
0
2
Type Prob -1.4066 0.0378 -
Type 3 

3
School ab. -3.2156 0.0245 6

w
3
Wage 1.6203 0.0121 3

03
Employment -1.5652 0.0241 6
q
0
3
Type Prob -0.8961 0.0249
Type 4 

4
School ab. -2.4926 0.0164 3

w
4
Wage 1.4220 0.0112 5

04
Employment -3.6237 0.0211 2
q
0
4
Type Prob 0.1578 0.0074 -
Type 5 

5
School ab. -2.1681 0.0136 1

w
5
Wage 1.7502 0.0121 2

05
Employment -3.6962 0.0102 1
q
0
5
Type Prob -0.8046 0.0495
Type 6 

6
School ab. -2.7820 0.0111 5

w
6
Wage 1.1207 0.0106 6

06
Employment -3.5454 0.0255 4
q
0
6
Type Prob 0.0 (normalized)
Note: The type probabilities are estimated using a logistic transform.
The resulting probabilities are 0.14 (type 1), 0.06 (type 2), 0.11 (type 3),
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0.3103 (type 4), 0.12 (type 5) and 0.26 (type 6). The correlation between 

and 
w
is 0.4228. The correlation between 

and -
0
is 0.59. The correlation
between 
w
and -
0
is 0.45.
Table 3A
The Return to Human Capital
Parameter (asymptotic st. error)
Non-Wage
Schooling 0.0081 (0.0005)
Employment
Schooling -0.0586 (0.0024)
Experience -0.0147 (0.0023)
Experience
2
0.0001 (0.0001)
Wages

2
w
0.2906 (0.0302)
group A group B
educ. 7-12 0.0048 (0.0012) 0.0614 (0.0018)
educ 13 0.0205 (0.0027) 0.0294 (0.0010)
educ 14 0.0456 (0.0019) 0.0370 (0.0013)
educ 15 -0.0223 (0.0023) -0.0136 (0.0017)
educ 16 0.0110 (0.0051) 0.0064 (0.0019)
educ 17 -0.0043 (0.0027) 0.0014 (0.0014)
experience 0.0308 (0.0009) 0.0850 (0.0010)
Experience
2
-0.0013 (0.0001) -0.0013 (0.0001)
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Table 3B
The Average and Local Returns to Schooling
Local Returns Average Returns
group A group B group A group B
Grade level
7-12 0.0048 0.0614 0.0048 0.0614
13 0.0253 0.0908 0.0077 0.0656
14 0.0709 0.1278 0.0156 0.0734
15 0.0486 0.1142 0.0193 0.0779
16 0.0596 0.1206 0.0233 0.0822
17-more 0.0553 0.1210 0.0262 0.0857
Note: Group A is composed of type 1, type 2 and type 3. Group B is
composed of type 4, type 5 and type 6.
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Table 4A
Some Correlations between School and Market Ability
Param (p value)
Corr(

i
; 
w
i
) 0.4321 (0.01)
Corr(

i
; 
0i
) 0.5939 (0.01)
Corr(
w
i
; 
0i
) 0.4493 (0.01)
Corr(

i
; '
m
1i
) 0.2711 (0.01)
Table 4B
Unobserved Heterogeneity, Mean Schooling Attainments
and Predicted Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Schooling Mean Wage Type
Schooling Ranking Wage Ranking Probability
Type 1 13.15 2 $6.03 6 0.14
Type 2 12.99 3 $10.05 4 0.06
Type 3 11.30 6 $6.19 5 0.11
Group A 12.40 0.31
Type 4 12.77 4 $15.85 2 0.31
Type 5 12.61 5 $21.76 1 0.12
Type 6 13.19 1 $12.09 3 0.26
Group B 12.90 0.69
Note: Group A is composed of type 1 ,2 and 3. Group B is composed of
types 4, 5 and 6.
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Table 5
Model Fit: Actual vs Predicted Schooling Attainments
Grade Level Predicted (%) Actual %
Grade 6 0.0% 0.3 %
Grade 7 0.9% 0.6%
Grade 8 2.4% 2.9%
Grade 9 4.8% 4.7%
Grade10 7.1% 6.0 %
Grade11 7.7% 7.5 %
Grade12 40.1% 39.6 %
Grade13 7.1% 7.0 %
Grade14 7.1% 7.7 %
Grade15 2.0% 2.9 %
Grade16 12.9% 12.9 %
Grade17 2.1% 2.5 %
Grade18 2.5% 2.4%
Grade19 1.8% 1.3%
Grade 20+ 1.2% 1.6%
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Table 6
Average Return to Schooling and Experience in the Population:
Structural Dynamic Programming vs OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DP/ML DP/ML OLS OLS/SPLINES
Specication random Homo. Homo. Homo.
coe. returns returns returns
Population Average
return to schooling
grade 12 0.0438 0.0122 0.0997 0.0879
grade 16 0.0639 0.0430 0.0997 0.1050
Population Average
return to experience
Experience 0.0682 0.0817 0.0516 0.0514
Experience
2
-0.0013 -0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0012
Model Fit
var:pred:wages
var:observedwages
66 % 25% 24 % 25%
Note: The average returns in column 1 (DP/ML) are obtained from the
structural dynamic programming maximum likelihood estimates reported in
Table 4B. The estimates obtained from a restricted version of the model
(with homogeneous returns) are in column 2. The OLS estimates (in column
3 and column 4) are computed on the cross-section of 1990. The OLS
regression with splines (column 4) has the same number of splines as the
structural model (column 1) and both OLS regressions contain experience
and experience squared.
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